Some ASN1 objects stored on some smartcards (for instance the
IASECC/CPX ones) do not comply strictly with the rules
8.6.2.3 and 8.6.2.3 from the ITU.
Since these rules are not some strict ones, let's have a loose
decoding option that can be displayed by the command:
opensc-explorer
asn1 7001 # for instance
Fix: issue #2224
2F01 is:
./opensc-explorer -r 0
OpenSC [3F00]> cat 2F01
00000000: 80 43 01 B8 46 04 04 B0 EC C1 47 03 94 01 80 4F .C..F.....G....O
00000010: 08 80 25 00 00 01 FF 01 00 E0 10 02 02 01 04 02 ..%.............
00000020: 02 01 04 02 02 01 00 02 02 01 00 78 08 06 06 2B ...........x...+
00000030: 81 22 F8 78 02 82 02 90 00 .".x.....
so the ASN1 decoder gets confused because it assumes that two bytes are
needed before getting the first tag 43/ISO7816_TAG_II_CARD_SERVICE.
In order to avoid such confusion, whenever the content of the EF.ATR/2F01 starts
with ISO7816_II_CATEGORY_TLV, we skip the first byte in order to parse
the ASN1 payload.
Fix: issue #2220
The previous commit was over simplified. According to the known
mechanism, we should have the following scope:
./pkcs11-tool --module ../lib/onepin-opensc-pkcs11.so -M
Using slot 0 with a present token (0x0)
Supported mechanisms:
SHA-1, digest
SHA224, digest
SHA256, digest
SHA384, digest
SHA512, digest
MD5, digest
RIPEMD160, digest
GOSTR3411, digest
RSA-X-509, keySize={512,2048}, hw, decrypt, sign, verify
RSA-PKCS, keySize={512,2048}, hw, decrypt, sign, verify
SHA1-RSA-PKCS, keySize={512,2048}, sign, verify
SHA256-RSA-PKCS, keySize={512,2048}, sign, verify
RSA-PKCS-PSS, keySize={512,2048}, hw, sign, verify
SHA1-RSA-PKCS-PSS, keySize={512,2048}, sign, verify
SHA256-RSA-PKCS-PSS, keySize={512,2048}, sign, verify
do not use the default flags yet:
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 1024, IASECC_CARD_DEFAULT_FLAGS, 0x10001);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 2048, IASECC_CARD_DEFAULT_FLAGS, 0x10001);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 512, IASECC_CARD_DEFAULT_FLAGS, 0x10001);
Contactless specific behaviour shall be added later on.
Depending on the "lifecycle" of the file, we may omit the authentication
operation. Typically if the card is in initialization or creation state,
the access control mechanism is inactive. If authentification can be
skiped, the card driver is responsible for setting the "acl_inactive"
variable in sc_file structure.
This made most of the applications crashing in Fedora 34 when
smart card was plugged in.
The suggested patch makes the code path more obvious for gcc to
handle.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1930652
card-opennpgp.c and pkcs15-openpgp.c have a strang way of
using sc_object_id_t to store what they call a binary_oid
or oid_binary. It is used to convert the EC curve asn1
returned in the cxdata.
This code uses asn1_decode_object_id to use sc_object_id_t
as used in the rest of the code.
The code and ec_curve tabes in card-openpgp.c where not changed.
pkcs15-openpgp.c was channge si to can use:
algorithm_info = sc_card_find_ec_alg(card, 0, &oid);
to retried the key_length to add to the pubkey and prkey entries.
The EC and EDDSA needs (i.e. field_length) to run.
On branch eddsa
Your branch is up to date with 'Jakuje/eddsa'.
Changes to be committed:
modified: card.c
modified: pkcs15-openpgp.c
The Ed25519 implementation in SoftHSM is now broken /non-interoperable. After fixing that,
the interoperability tests should work with this script:
* SoftHSMv2#528: Avoid creating duplicate mechanisms
* SoftHSMv2#522: Fix advertised min and max mechanism sizes according to final PKCS#11 3.0 specification
* SoftHSMv2#526: Adjust EDDSA code to return valid EC_PARAMS according to the final PKCS #11 3.0 specification
Since 09a594d bringing ECC support to openPGP card, it did not count
with GNUK. This adds exception for GNUK to unbreak ECC signatures
as GNUK presents BCD version < 3.
... as reported by coverity scan.
p11cards are freed by emptying the virtual slots. virtual slots are
creatd with the framework's create_tokens. Hence, we need to free
p11card if no tokens were created.
I am using a somewhat modified version of IsoApplet. Up till now it worked fine. However recently I stumbled upon a web site that
forces a client cert auth with RSA-PSS. And (at least on windows, using minidriver) it didn't work. It looks to me, that it's a bug
in the PSS support code in minidriver, as I cannot find any place where a MGF1 padding scheme is specified. And since none is specified
signing fails. This patch fixes this. It assumes, that the same hash is used for hashing and padding.
This fixes a problem reported in Nitrokey forum at
https://support.nitrokey.com/t/veracrypt-encryption-with-nitrokey-error/2872
as inability to save the VeraCrypt's keyfile onto the token
after deleting an existing one, unless the PKCS11 is reinitialized.
Reason: commit cbc53b9 "OpenPGP: Support write certificate for Gnuk"
introduced a condition on getting the blob handle, which is surplus
(the pgp_find_blob() function actually does that) and prevents
the blob refresh upon deletion, breaking the logic introduced
earlier in commit 9e04ae4 and causing the higher-level effect reported.
While at it, corrected comments to actually reflect the flow logic.
Tested on Fedora 33 using the repro steps from the forum and Nitrokey Pro.
Signed-off-by: alt3r 3go <alt3r.3go@protonmail.com>
Option --use-locking has C_Initialize pass in parameters with the
CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK to tell module to use threads. The default is it passes NULL
which says threads are not needed.
The following is not designed to be used by the general user. There are for debugging
and test scripts and only compiled if the system has threads.
Option --test-threads <arg> can be passed multiple times. Each one starts a thread.
<arg> is a list of 2 byte commands seperated by ":". The thread will execute these.
Current commands are:
IN - C_Initialize(NULL)
IL - C_Initialize with CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK
Pn - Pause for n seconds
GI - C_GetInfo
SL - C_GetSlotList
Tn - C_GetTokenInfo from slot_index n
These are just enough calls to see if threads are working in the module.
Output is written to stderr.
Changes to be committed:
modified: doc/tools/pkcs11-tool.1.xml
modified: src/tools/Makefile.am
modified: src/tools/pkcs11-tool.c
While trying to setup an OpenSC context, the global_locking
and detect cards, it is possible that multiple threads may
call C_Initialize. The current code tries to prevent this using
"if (context == NULL)" but this is not a mutex, and
multiple threads may endup overwrite contexts and global locking and
cause additional problems, with pcsc and segfault.
FireFox appears to do this see #2032
The PR adds a mutex or Critical section to make sure only one
thread creates the context sets the global_locking and does
the initial detect cards, etc.
This allows the global_lock (if requested) to be setup
which is then used for other calls.
All but the first call to C_Initialize will return with CKR_OK,
others will return CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED.
Date: Mon Jan 11 12:47:12 2021 -0600
Changes to be committed:
modified: src/pkcs11/pkcs11-global.c
Fixes#2139
Added code to support mechanism GENERIC-SECRET-KEY-GEN.
Improved --help and doc/tools/pkcs11-tool.1.xml because key gen
of symmetric keys pass CKA_VALUE_LEN which is length of key in bytes.
Tested with:
./pkcs11-tool --module /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \
--login --label generic-64 --keygen --key-type GENERIC:64 \
--mechanism GENERIC-SECRET-KEY-GEN
./pkcs11-tool --module /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so --login -O
config option for MyEID: "disable_hw_pkcs1_padding"
If user set this option to non zero, OpenSC is forced to calculate padding
in software. This will allow users to use RSA 1024 with SHA512.
The --signature-format openssl in pkcs11-tool does the correct
operation to convert the OpenSSL formated signature to rs for PKCS11
This commit modifies pkcs11/openssl.c to convert back to sequence
for EVP_VerifyFinal
Without this mod the signature file was passed unmodified to
PKCS11, then to EVP_VerifyFinal but this violates PKCS11 standard.
On branch ECDSA-flags
Changes to be committed:
modified: openssl.c
This PR is based on discussion with @popovec in
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/issues/2181
and https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/2187
which was cherry-picked as 5e5300816c8
This has been tested with PIV, MyEID and Smartcard-HSM.
with ECDSA keys.
The main fixes include :
- Setting "flags" in card drivers
- added code to sc_pkcs15-compute-signature for handle ECDSA with hashes
- code in framework-pkcs15.c
Signatures made by pkcs11-tool -sigm verify with openssl
but pkcs11-tool --verify does not work with ECDSA but does with RSA
I suspect it has to do with:
and some then creating the wrong PKCS11 mechanisms
It should work with the epass2003 which does hashes in the driver.
CKM_ECDSA and CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 cannot be registered in the same way.
We need to use sc_pkcs11_register_sign_and_hash_mechanism ()
for CKM_ECDSA_SHA1.
This fix also enables more ECDSA-SHAxxx mechanisms in framework-pkcs15.c
Tested: MyEID 4.0.1 (secp256r1 with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512)
CI tests (Travis + OsEID) for ECDSA-SHAxxx mechanisms are also enabled.
Vincent JARDIN
Jakub Jelen
Peter Popovec
Doug Engert
Frank Morgner
Luka Logar
alt3r 3go
ihsinme
Zhang Xiaohui