The framework-pkcs15.c did not add hashes correctly if the card did not support RSA RAW.
This change fixes that and only adds hashes if the card did not specify a list of hashes.
It also will not add hashes done in software if ENABLE_OPENSSL is not specified.
Some error conditions are also tested for EC mechanisms.
See bug report #241 for more information.
If OpenSSL is not used then the functions from card-dnie.c are not
defined and in particular dnie_match_card() is not defined.
In that case we use a fake dnie_match_card() that just returns false.
add the possibility to store public ECC keys encoded according to SPKI
EC pubkey storing: Check if params are available before copying.
pkcs15-lib.c / sc_pkcs15init_store_public_key may be called with keyargs->key.u.ec.params.value == NULL. In this case, allocating and copying the parameters will fail. Add a check to prevent this.
Add a --no-prompt flag to pkcs15-tool (i.e. the equivalent of the --no-prompt flag of pkcs15-init). As to aid readers with keypads (as commonly used in the medical space).
The same function iasecc_sm_external_authentication() was declared in
two different .h files.
In file included from ../../src/libopensc/iasecc.h:27:0,
from sm-card-iasecc.c:44:
../../src/libopensc/iasecc-sdo.h:324:5: warning: redundant redeclaration of `iasecc_sm_external_authentication' [-Wredundant-decls]
In file included from ../../src/libopensc/opensc.h:44:0,
from sm-card-iasecc.c:40:
../../src/libopensc/sm.h:352:5: note: previous declaration of `iasecc_sm_external_authentication' was here
framework-pkcs15: Duplicate public key related to private key rather than referencing the framework object
Referencing the related public key is required to return PKCS#11 attributes for a private key only available
in the public key object (i.e. CKA_MODULUS). This patch adds a copy of the public key to the private key object rather than
referencing the public key object in the framework. This prevents SEGV when the public key framework object
is deleted with C_DestroyObject, but the reference from the public key remains intact.
The bug leads to all kind of stability problems when keys are created and deleted in the same session.
The patch is in particular important if OpenSC is used with EJBCA or any other application using the
SUN PKCS#11 provider: When generating key pairs, then the public key object is eventually garbage collected
which removes the related object in the PKCS#11 module. Because there is no fixed time for this operation,
corruption occurs at random.
In a next step, the remaining related_xxx fields in sc_pkcs11_object should be revised and possibly removed.
framework: Added more error checking
If a certificate is deleted after the related private key, then the driver
picks the wrong certificate EF, leading to an CKR_GENERAL_ERROR or the wrong
certificate being deleted.
Private key import is not supported by the SmartCard-HSM. However there is no error code
if it is still tried using pkcs15-init or from within Firefox.
openpgp-tool: Added PRIVATE-DO-3 dump option
The bytes of private-do-3 will be written to stdout raw.
Requires pin and verify to work.
openpgp-tool: Fix private-do-3 dump for Windows
fwrite will convert line endings on Windows if the destination
is not openend in binary mode. As this actually dumps binary data,
it makes sense to reopen stdout in binary mode for the dump.
openpgp-tool: Enable dumping of all DOs
PRIVATE-DO-<X> can now be dumped via the -d/--do switches and
the DO number as a parameter.
PRIVATE-DO-[12] can be dumped without verification.
PRIVATE-DO-3 requires CHV2, PRIVATE-DO-4 CHV3.
openpgp-tool: Dump DOs as hex into a tty, binary otherwise
This prevents messing up a terminal if there really _is_
binary data in a private DO. To force the binary data to a terminal,
pipe through cat.
openpgp-tool: Hint at the pin and verify options on error
SC_ERROR_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED is the error code
here when dumping a private DO without the appropriate verification.
openpgp-tool: Explictly use --raw for binary ouput
The --raw switch already exists. If present, raw binary will be written,
a pretty-printed hex/ascii representation otherwise.
card-asepcos: removed dead code
card-authentic: removed dead code
card-belpic: removed dead code
card-epass2003: removed dead code
card-flex: removed dead code
card-gpk: removed dead code
card-oberthur: removed dead code
card-piv: removed dead code
card-setcos: removed dead code
ctbcs: removed dead code
cwa14890: removed dead code
muscle: removed dead code
pkcs15-atrust-acos: removed dead code
pkcs15-gemsafeV1: removed dead code
pkcs15-skey: removed dead code
reader-ctapi: removed dead code
framework-pkcs15: removed dead code
pkcs11-object: removed dead code
pkcs15-asepcos: removed dead code
pkcs15-cardos: removed dead code
pkcs15-jcop: removed dead code
pkcs15-lib: removed dead code
pkcs15-oberthur: removed dead code
parse: removed dead code
sclex: removed dead code
sm-card-authentic: removed dead code
sm-card-iasecc: removed dead code
sm-cwa14890: removed dead code
sm-global-platform: removed dead code
sc-test: removed dead code
pkcs11-tool: removed dead code
pkcs15-tool: removed dead code
Support nonces that are not only 8 bytes in
Mutual Authenticate. Use the witness length
to determine the nonce size, thus existing
systems using 8 bytes will continue to use 8
bytes. However, with AES 256, the nonces could
be a single block size of 16 bytes or greater.
RSA and EC keys have different usage attributes. Appropriate attributes are set
When using --keypairgen the user can use the --usage-sign, --usage-decrypt,
and --usage-derive. to get finer control.
Changes to be committed:
modified: tools/pkcs11-tool.c
This adds algorithm IDs 0xA, 0xA, 0xC which as documented
by the NIST PIV specification is algorithms AES-128, AES-192
and AES-256 respectively.
This patch also addresses some of the hardcodes that prevented
nonces greater than the single byte TLV length tags would allow.
It was explicitly tested with AES-256 and 256 byte nonces.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <w2.roberts@samsung.com>
Contact cards have ATR-s, contactless not. Only contact
cards should be broken so that they answer 0x9000 to application
selection, so this should be failsafe.
Doug Engert
Ludovic Rousseau
Ludovic Rousseau
Philip Wendland
Dirk-Willem van Gulik
Andreas Schwier
Sumedha Widyadharma
andbil
Frank Morgner
William Roberts
Henryk Plötz
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Joachim Bauch
Viktor Tarasov
Emanuele Pucciarelli
Raul Metsma
Henrik Andersson
Martin Paljak