From fa333542db83e22e266e9eaa22aee0dbe1338dc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sth Date: Wed, 11 May 2005 14:00:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Don't used cashed PINs for a UserConsent key! git-svn-id: https://www.opensc-project.org/svnp/opensc/trunk@2342 c6295689-39f2-0310-b995-f0e70906c6a9 --- src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c | 18 ------------------ 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c index 2dcce04d..56955698 100644 --- a/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c +++ b/src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c @@ -1751,24 +1751,6 @@ static CK_RV pkcs15_prkey_sign(struct sc_pkcs11_session *ses, void *obj, sc_debug(context, "Initiating signing operation, mechanism 0x%x.\n", pMechanism->mechanism); - /* If this key requires user consent for every N operations, - * we may have to present the PIN again and again. - * For now, we require that either the terminal has a key pad, - * or the user allows pin caching. We may want to add GUI - * function pointers though. - */ - if (prkey->prv_p15obj->user_consent) { - /* XXX we should really keep track how often the key - * is used, and how often we need to ask the user for - * her PIN. - * For now, we just assume user_consent is 1. - */ - /* XXX - do we require an sc_lock here? */ - rv = revalidate_pin(data, ses); - if (rv < 0) - return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, ses->slot->card->reader); - } - /* See which of the alternative keys supports signing */ while (prkey && !(prkey->prv_info->usage