iso-sm: avoid allocation of big chunk of data
Use unencrypted APDU's resplen to estimate the size of the required SM response buffer
This commit is contained in:
parent
6f0f42c506
commit
aa940e8619
|
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static int sm_encrypt(const struct iso_sm_ctx *ctx, sc_card_t *card,
|
|||
u8 *p, *le = NULL, *sm_data = NULL, *fdata = NULL, *mac_data = NULL,
|
||||
*asn1 = NULL, *mac = NULL, *resp_data = NULL;
|
||||
size_t sm_data_len, fdata_len, mac_data_len, asn1_len, mac_len, le_len;
|
||||
int r, cse;
|
||||
int r;
|
||||
sc_apdu_t *sm_apdu = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!apdu || !ctx || !card || !card->reader || !psm_apdu) {
|
||||
|
@ -313,17 +313,7 @@ static int sm_encrypt(const struct iso_sm_ctx *ctx, sc_card_t *card,
|
|||
}
|
||||
mac_data_len = r;
|
||||
|
||||
/* get le and data depending on the case of the insecure command */
|
||||
cse = apdu->cse;
|
||||
if ((apdu->le/ctx->block_length + 1)*ctx->block_length + 18 > 0xff+1)
|
||||
/* for encrypted APDUs we usually get authenticated status bytes (4B),
|
||||
* a MAC (11B) and a cryptogram with padding indicator (3B without
|
||||
* data). The cryptogram is always padded to the block size. */
|
||||
/*cse |= SC_APDU_EXT;*/
|
||||
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,
|
||||
"Response data may be truncated, because it doesn't fit into a short length APDU.");
|
||||
|
||||
switch (cse) {
|
||||
switch (apdu->cse) {
|
||||
case SC_APDU_CASE_1:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT:
|
||||
|
@ -476,22 +466,17 @@ static int sm_encrypt(const struct iso_sm_ctx *ctx, sc_card_t *card,
|
|||
sm_apdu->datalen = sm_data_len;
|
||||
sm_apdu->lc = sm_data_len;
|
||||
sm_apdu->le = 0;
|
||||
if (cse & SC_APDU_EXT) {
|
||||
if (apdu->cse & SC_APDU_EXT) {
|
||||
sm_apdu->cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_EXT;
|
||||
#if OPENSC_NOT_BOGUS_ANYMORE
|
||||
sm_apdu->resplen = 0xffff+1;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sm_apdu->resplen = SC_MAX_EXT_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
sm_apdu->cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
|
||||
#if OPENSC_NOT_BOGUS_ANYMORE
|
||||
sm_apdu->resplen = 0xff+1;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sm_apdu->resplen = SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
resp_data = calloc(sm_apdu->resplen);
|
||||
/* for encrypted APDUs we usually get authenticated status bytes
|
||||
* (4B), a MAC (2B without data) and a cryptogram with padding
|
||||
* indicator (3B without data). The cryptogram is always padded to
|
||||
* the block size. */
|
||||
sm_apdu->resplen = 9 + mac_len + (apdu->resplen/ctx->block_length + 1)*ctx->block_length;
|
||||
resp_data = calloc(sm_apdu->resplen, 1);
|
||||
if (!resp_data) {
|
||||
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue