giomba
/
opensc
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Adds message digest and DER encoding if necessary. 

Patch by Mathias Brossard <mathias.brossard@idealx.com>


git-svn-id: https://www.opensc-project.org/svnp/opensc/trunk@1770 c6295689-39f2-0310-b995-f0e70906c6a9
This commit is contained in:
aj 2004-04-18 18:14:39 +00:00
parent cc91de4a35
commit 2daf4c814d
1 changed files with 45 additions and 16 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

61
src/sslengines/p11_rsa.c
View File

@ -159,37 +159,66 @@ pkcs11_rsa_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
PKCS11_CTX *ctx;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_ULONG sigsize;
int rv;
int rv, ssl = ((type == NID_md5_sha1) ? 1 : 0);
int rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
CK_ULONG sigsize = rsa_size;
unsigned char *encoded = NULL;
if (key == NULL)
return -1;
return 0;
ctx = KEY2CTX(key);
priv = PRIVKEY(key);
slot = TOKEN2SLOT(priv->parent);
session = PRIVSLOT(slot)->session;
if (ssl) {
if((m_len != 36) /* SHA1 + MD5 */ ||
((m_len + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > rsa_size)) {
return(0); /* the size is wrong */
}
} else {
ASN1_TYPE parameter = { V_ASN1_NULL, { NULL } };
ASN1_STRING digest = { m_len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, (void*)m };
X509_ALGOR algor = { NULL, &parameter };
X509_SIG digest_info = { &algor, &digest };
int size;
/* Fetch the OID of the algorithm used */
if((algor.algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type)) &&
(algor.algorithm->length) &&
/* Get the size of the encoded DigestInfo */
(size = i2d_X509_SIG(&digest_info, NULL)) &&
/* Check that size is compatible with PKCS#11 padding */
(size + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING <= rsa_size) &&
(encoded = malloc(rsa_size))) {
unsigned char *tmp = encoded;
/* Actually do the encoding */
i2d_X509_SIG(&digest_info,&tmp);
m = encoded;
m_len = size;
} else {
return(0);
}
}
memset(&mechanism, 0, sizeof(mechanism));
mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit(session, &mechanism, priv->object));
if (rv)
goto fail;
/* API is somewhat fishy here. *siglen is 0 on entry (cleared
* by OpenSSL). The library assumes that the memory passed
* by the caller is always big enough */
sigsize = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx,
C_Sign(session, (CK_BYTE *) m, m_len, sigret, &sigsize));
if (rv)
goto fail;
if((rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_SignInit
(session, &mechanism, priv->object))) == 0) {
rv = CRYPTOKI_call(ctx, C_Sign
(session, (CK_BYTE *) m, m_len,
sigret, &sigsize));
}
*siglen = sigsize;
return 1;
free(encoded);
fail:PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
return 0;
if (rv) {
PKCS11err(PKCS11_F_PKCS11_RSA_SIGN, pkcs11_map_err(rv));
}
return (rv) ? 0 : 1;
}
/* Lousy hack alert. If RSA_verify detects that the key has the