spelling fixes

Fix various spelling errors, mostly in comments but also in texts displayed.

Errors found & interactively fixed using 'codespell', with additional manual
checks after the fixes.
This commit is contained in:
Peter Marschall 2020-08-29 10:34:51 +02:00
parent 8ada99b4d3
commit 16c889cf7d
45 changed files with 72 additions and 72 deletions

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ matrix:
env:
global:
# The next declaration are encrypted envirnmet variables, created via the
# The next declaration are encrypted environment variables, created via the
# "travis encrypt" command using the project repo's public key
# COVERITY_SCAN_TOKEN
- secure: "UkHn7wy4im8V1nebCWbAetnDSOLRUbOlF6++ovk/7Bnso1/lnhXHelyzgRxfD/oI68wm9nnRV+RQEZ9+72Ug1CyvHxyyxxkwal/tPeHH4B/L+aGdPi0id+5OZSKIm77VP3m5s102sJMJgH7DFd03+nUd0K26p0tk8ad4j1geV4c="
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ before_script:
./configure --host=$HOST --with-completiondir=/tmp --disable-openssl --disable-readline --disable-zlib --disable-notify --prefix=${TRAVIS_BUILD_DIR}/win32/opensc || cat config.log;
fi
# Optionally try to upload to Coverity Scan
# On error (propably quota is exhausted), just continue
# On error (probably quota is exhausted), just continue
- if [ "${DO_COVERITY_SCAN}" = "yes" ]; then curl -s 'https://scan.coverity.com/scripts/travisci_build_coverity_scan.sh' | bash || true; fi
- if [ "${DO_SIMULATION}" = "javacard" ]; then

4
NEWS
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@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ New separate CAC1 driver using the old CAC specification (#1502)
* Fixed --id for `C_GenerateKey`, DES and DES3 keygen mechanism (#857)
* Added `--derive-pass-der` option
* Added `--generate-random` option
* Add GOSTR3410 keypair generation
* Add GOSTR3410 key pair generation
* `npa-tool` (new)
* Allows read/write access to EAC tokens
* Allows PIN management for EAC tokens
@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ New in 0.15.0; 2015-05-11
allow extended length APDUs
accept no output for 'SELECT' MF and 'SELECT' DF_NAME APDUs
fixed sc_driver_version check
adjusted send/receive size accoriding to card capabilities
adjusted send/receive size according to card capabilities
in iso7816 make SELECT agnosting to sc_path_t's aid
* asn1
support multi-bytes tags

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@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_UNKNOWN_WARNING_OPTION], [test "${have_unknown_warning_opti
AC_ARG_ENABLE(
[fuzzing],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fuzzing],[enable compile of fuzzing tests @<:@disabled@:>@, note that CFLAGS and FUZZING_LIBS should be set accoringly, e.g. to something like CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,fuzzer" FUZZING_LIBS="-fsanitize=fuzzer"])],
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-fuzzing],[enable compile of fuzzing tests @<:@disabled@:>@, note that CFLAGS and FUZZING_LIBS should be set accordingly, e.g. to something like CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,fuzzer" FUZZING_LIBS="-fsanitize=fuzzer"])],
,
[enable_fuzzing="no"]
)

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@ -273,7 +273,7 @@
<option>--moz-cert</option> <replaceable>filename</replaceable>,
<option>-z</option> <replaceable>filename</replaceable>
</term>
<listitem><para>Test a Mozilla-like keypair generation
<listitem><para>Test a Mozilla-like key pair generation
and certificate request. Specify the <replaceable>filename</replaceable>
to the certificate file.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ nodist_noinst_DATA = opensc.conf.example
# Make sure we build this every time
# as there is no dependency for this.
# Can be removed if MSVC is not requried.
# Can be removed if MSVC is not required.
force:
opensc.conf.example: opensc.conf.example.in force

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@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ app default {
# QES is only possible with a Comfort Reader (CAT-K), which holds a
# cryptographic key to authenticate itself as signature terminal (ST).
# We usually will use the reader's capability to sign the data.
# However, during develpement you may specify soft certificates and
# However, during development you may specify soft certificates and
# keys for a ST below.
# The following example EAC PKI can be found in vicc's example data:
# https://github.com/frankmorgner/vsmartcard/tree/master/virtualsmartcard/npa-example-data
@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ app opensc-pkcs11 {
# init_pin_in_so_session: C_InitPIN() in CKU_SO logged session:
# User PIN 'UNBLOCK' is protected by SOPIN. (PUK == SOPIN).
# # Actually this style works only for the PKCS15 contents without SOPIN.
# # For those with SOPIN, this mode will be usefull for the cards without
# # For those with SOPIN, this mode will be useful for the cards without
# # modes 00 and 01 of ISO command 'RESET RETRY COUNTER'. --vt
#
# Default: none

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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ size_t sc_apdu_get_length(const sc_apdu_t *apdu, unsigned int proto)
* @param apdu APDU to be encoded as an octet string
* @param proto protocol version to be used
* @param out output buffer of size outlen.
* @param outlen size of hte output buffer
* @param outlen size of the output buffer
* @return SC_SUCCESS on success and an error code otherwise
*/
int sc_apdu2bytes(sc_context_t *ctx, const sc_apdu_t *apdu,

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@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static int cac_parse_properties_object(sc_card_t *card, u8 type,
if (data_len < 11)
return -1;
/* Initilize: non-PKI applet */
/* Initialize: non-PKI applet */
object->privatekey = 0;
val = data;
@ -1299,7 +1299,7 @@ static int cac_parse_aid(sc_card_t *card, cac_private_data_t *priv, const u8 *ai
memcpy(new_object.path.aid.value, aid, aid_len);
new_object.path.aid.len = aid_len;
/* Call without OID set will just select the AID without subseqent
/* Call without OID set will just select the AID without subsequent
* OID selection, which we need to figure out just now
*/
cac_select_file_by_type(card, &new_object.path, NULL);

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@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static int cardos_init(sc_card_t *card)
* Most, if not all, cardos cards do extended, but not chaining
*/
if (card->reader->max_send_size == 255 && card->reader->max_recv_size == 256) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "reseting reader to use data_field_length");
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, "resetting reader to use data_field_length");
card->reader->max_send_size = data_field_length - 6;
card->reader->max_recv_size = data_field_length - 3;
}
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static const int ef_acl[9] = {
/* XXX: ADMIN should be an ACL type of its own, or mapped
* to erase */
SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, /* ADMIN EF (modify meta information?) */
-1, /* INC (-> cylic fixed files) */
-1, /* INC (-> cyclic fixed files) */
-1 /* DEC */
};
@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ cardos_decipher(struct sc_card *card,
r = iso_ops->decipher(card, crgram, crgram_len, out, outlen);
/*
* 5.3 supports RAW as well as PKCS1 and PSS
* decription may strip padding if card supports it
* description may strip padding if card supports it
* with cards that support RAW, it always appears to
* drop first 00 that is start of padding.
*/

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@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ static int entersafe_gen_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_entersafe_gen_key_data *data)
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu,0,0,0,0);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate keypair failed");
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, sc_check_sw(card,apdu.sw1,apdu.sw2),"EnterSafe generate key pair failed");
/* read public key via READ PUBLIC KEY */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xE6, 0x2A, data->key_id);

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@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ epass2003_gen_key(struct sc_card *card, sc_epass2003_gen_key_data * data)
r = sc_transmit_apdu_t(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "generate keypair failed");
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "generate key pair failed");
/* read public key */
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xb4, 0x02, 0x00);

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@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static const int ef_acl[9] = {
/* XXX: ADMIN should be an ACL type of its own, or mapped
* to erase */
-1, /* ADMIN EF (modify meta information?) */
-1, /* INC (-> cylic fixed files) */
-1, /* INC (-> cyclic fixed files) */
-1 /* DEC */
};

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@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ isoApplet_ctl_import_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_isoApplet_import_key_t *arg
*
* The first step is to perform a MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT as it would be done
* with on-card key generation. The second step is PUT DATA (instead of
* GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEYPAIR).
* GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR).
*/
/* MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT (SET). Set the algorithm and key references. */

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@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static const int ef_acl[9] = {
/* XXX: ADMIN should be an ACL type of its own, or mapped
* to erase */
SC_AC_OP_ERASE, /* ADMIN EF (modify meta information?) */
-1, /* INC (-> cylic fixed files) */
-1, /* INC (-> cyclic fixed files) */
-1 /* DEC */
};

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@ -2193,7 +2193,7 @@ static int piv_get_challenge(sc_card_t *card, u8 *rnd, size_t len)
LOG_TEST_GOTO_ERR(card->ctx, r, "No support for random data");
}
/* NIST 800-73-3 says use 9B, previous verisons used 00 */
/* NIST 800-73-3 says use 9B, previous versions used 00 */
r = piv_general_io(card, 0x87, 0x00, 0x9B, sbuf, sizeof sbuf, rbuf, sizeof rbuf);
/*
* piv_get_challenge is called in a loop.
@ -2619,7 +2619,7 @@ err:
/*
* parse a CCC to test if this is a Dual CAC/PIV
* We read teh CCC using the PIV API.
* We read the CCC using the PIV API.
* Look for CAC RID=A0 00 00 00 79
*/
static int piv_parse_ccc(sc_card_t *card, u8* rbuf, size_t rbuflen)
@ -3161,7 +3161,7 @@ static int piv_match_card_continued(sc_card_t *card)
* Discovery Object introduced in 800-73-3 so will return 0 if found and PIV applet active.
* Will fail with SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND if 800-73-3 and no Discovery object.
* But some other card could also return SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND.
* Will fail for other reasons if wrong applet is selected, or bad PIV implimentation.
* Will fail for other reasons if wrong applet is selected, or bad PIV implementation.
*/
sc_debug(card->ctx,SC_LOG_DEBUG_MATCH, "PIV_MATCH card->type:%d CI:%08x r:%d\n", card->type, priv->card_issues, r);
@ -3753,7 +3753,7 @@ static int piv_card_reader_lock_obtained(sc_card_t *card, int was_reset)
r = piv_select_aid(card, piv_aids[0].value, piv_aids[0].len_short, temp, &templen);
sc_debug(card->ctx,SC_LOG_DEBUG_MATCH, "PIV_MATCH piv_select_aid card->type:%d r:%d\n", card->type, r);
} else {
r = 0; /* cant do anything with this card, hope there was no interference */
r = 0; /* can't do anything with this card, hope there was no interference */
}
}

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@ -322,14 +322,14 @@ int sc_connect_card(sc_reader_t *reader, sc_card_t **card_out)
sc_card_t uninitialized = *card;
sc_log(ctx, "matching built-in ATRs");
for (i = 0; ctx->card_drivers[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* FIXME If we had a clean API description, we'd propably get a
/* FIXME If we had a clean API description, we'd probably get a
* cleaner implementation of the driver's match_card and init,
* which should normally *not* modify the card object if
* unsuccessful. However, after years of relentless hacking, reality
* is different: The card object is changed in virtually every card
* driver so in order to prevent unwanted interaction, we reset the
* card object here and hope that the card driver at least doesn't
* allocate any internal ressources that need to be freed. If we
* allocate any internal resources that need to be freed. If we
* had more time, we should refactor the existing code to not
* modify sc_card_t until complete success (possibly by combining
* `match_card()` and `init()`) */

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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
*/
typedef struct cwa_tlv_st {
u8 *buf; /** local copy of TLV byte array */
size_t buflen; /** lengt of buffer */
size_t buflen; /** length of buffer */
unsigned int tag; /** tag ID */
size_t len; /** length of data field */
u8 *data; /** pointer to start of data in buf buffer */

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@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int msc_get_challenge(sc_card_t *card, unsigned short dataLength, unsigned short
int msc_generate_keypair(sc_card_t *card, int privateKey, int publicKey, int algorithm, int keySize, int options)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 buffer[16]; /* Keypair payload length */
u8 buffer[16]; /* Key pair payload length */
u8 *ptr = buffer;
int r;
unsigned short prRead = 0xFFFF, prWrite = 0x0002, prCompute = 0x0002,

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@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ struct sc_card_operations {
int (*update_binary)(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int idx,
const u8 * buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags);
/**
* @brief Sets (part of) the content fo an EF to its logical erased state
* @brief Sets (part of) the content of an EF to its logical erased state
*
* Implementation of this call back is optional and may be NULL.
*
@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ int sc_bytes2apdu(sc_context_t *ctx, const u8 *buf, size_t len, sc_apdu_t *apdu)
* @param apdu APDU to be encoded as an octet string
* @param proto protocol version to be used
* @param out output buffer of size outlen.
* @param outlen size of hte output buffer
* @param outlen size of the output buffer
* @return SC_SUCCESS on success and an error code otherwise
*/
int sc_apdu2bytes(sc_context_t *ctx, const sc_apdu_t *apdu,
@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ int sc_update_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int idx, const u8 * buf,
size_t count, unsigned long flags);
/**
* Sets (part of) the content fo an EF to its logical erased state
* Sets (part of) the content of an EF to its logical erased state
* @param card struct sc_card object on which to issue the command
* @param idx index within the file for the data to be erased
* @param count number of bytes to erase

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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int cardos_fix_token_info(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
&& sa->operations == 0 && sa->algo_ref == 0)
break;
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "supported_algos[%d] mechamism:0x%8.8x", i, sa->mechanism);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "supported_algos[%d] mechanism:0x%8.8x", i, sa->mechanism);
switch(sa->mechanism) {
case 0x01 :
/*
@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int cardos_fix_token_info(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
* correct the mechanism in tokenInfo
*/
if (sa->reference & 0x10) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Changeing mechanism to CKM_RSA_X_509 based on reference");
sc_log(card->ctx, "Changing mechanism to CKM_RSA_X_509 based on reference");
passed->new_flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_RAW
| SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_NONE;
sa->mechanism = 0x03;

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@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ sc_pkcs15emu_openpgp_init(sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
/* XXX: check if "halfkeys" can be stored with gpg2. If not, add keypairs in one loop */
/* XXX: check if "halfkeys" can be stored with gpg2. If not, add key pairs in one loop */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
sc_pkcs15_prkey_info_t prkey_info;
sc_pkcs15_object_t prkey_obj;

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@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ sc_pkcs15_convert_prkey(struct sc_pkcs15_prkey *pkcs15_key, void *evp_key)
dst->ecpointQ.len = buflen;
/*
* In OpenSC the field_length is in bits. Not all curves are a mutiple of 8.
* In OpenSC the field_length is in bits. Not all curves are a multiple of 8.
* EC_POINT_point2oct handles this and returns octstrings that can handle
* these curves. Get real field_length from OpenSSL.
*/

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@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int sc_pkcs15_derive(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
* Unwrap a key into a key object on card.
* in holds the wrapped key data
* the target file that target_key points to must be created before calling this function
* Use pkcs15init to peform the complete unwrapping operation and create the pkcs#15 object for the new key.
* Use pkcs15init to perform the complete unwrapping operation and create the pkcs#15 object for the new key.
*/
int sc_pkcs15_unwrap(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
const struct sc_pkcs15_object *key,

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@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int pcsc_lock(sc_reader_t *reader)
switch (rv) {
case SCARD_E_INVALID_VALUE:
/* This is retuned in case of the same reader was re-attached */
/* This is returned in case of the same reader was re-attached */
case SCARD_E_INVALID_HANDLE:
case SCARD_E_READER_UNAVAILABLE:
r = pcsc_connect(reader);
@ -1695,7 +1695,7 @@ static int pcsc_wait_for_event(sc_context_t *ctx, unsigned int event_mask, sc_re
/* Windows wants us to manually reset the changed state */
rsp->dwEventState &= ~SCARD_STATE_CHANGED;
/* By default, ignore a hotplug event as if a timout
/* By default, ignore a hotplug event as if a timeout
* occurred, since it may be an unrequested removal or
* false alarm. Just continue to loop and check at the end
* of this function whether we need to return the attached

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@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ extern "C" {
*/
/*
* 1.1.0 depracated ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings(), ERR_free_strings()
* 1.1.0 deprecated ERR_load_crypto_strings(), SSL_load_error_strings(), ERR_free_strings()
* and ENGINE_load_dynamic.EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init are replaced
* by EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset.
* But for compatability with LibreSSL and older OpenSSL. OpenSC uses the older functions
* But for compatibility with LibreSSL and older OpenSSL. OpenSC uses the older functions
*/
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
# if defined(OPENSSL_API_COMPAT) && OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x10100000L

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@ -4759,7 +4759,7 @@ DWORD WINAPI CardSignData(__in PCARD_DATA pCardData, __inout PCARD_SIGNING_INFO
if (0 == (CARD_PADDING_INFO_PRESENT & pInfo->dwSigningFlags)) {
/* When CARD_PADDING_INFO_PRESENT is not set in dwSigningFlags, this is
* the basic version of the signing structure. (If this is not the
* basic verison of the signing structure, the minidriver should return
* basic version of the signing structure, the minidriver should return
* ERROR_REVISION_MISMATCH.) The minidriver should only do PKCS1
* padding and use the value in aiHashAlg. */
logprintf(pCardData, 3, "CARD_PADDING_INFO_PRESENT not set\n");

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@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ pkcs15_init_slot(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot,
if (p15card->tokeninfo)
tokeninfo_len = strlen(p15card->tokeninfo->label);
/* Print the possibly truncated token label with at least 4
* characters followed by the PIN label in paranthesis */
* characters followed by the PIN label in parenthesis */
if (tokeninfo_len == 0
|| pin_len + strlen("L... ()") > 32) {
/* There is no token label or it doesn't fit,
@ -3011,7 +3011,7 @@ pkcs15_gen_keypair(struct sc_pkcs11_slot *slot, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL always_auth = CK_FALSE;
sc_log(context, "Keypair generation, mech = 0x%0lx",
sc_log(context, "Key pair generation, mech = 0x%0lx",
pMechanism->mechanism);
if (pMechanism->mechanism != CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN
@ -3984,9 +3984,9 @@ pkcs15_prkey_sign(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj,
break;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
flags = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PSS;
/* The hash was done ouside of the module */
/* The hash was done outside of the module */
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_NONE;
/* Omited parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 ? */
/* Omitted parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 ? */
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) {
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_MGF1_SHA1;
if (ulDataLen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
@ -4013,7 +4013,7 @@ pkcs15_prkey_sign(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj,
case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
flags = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PSS;
/* Omited parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 and SHA1 hash ? */
/* Omitted parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 and SHA1 hash ? */
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) {
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1;
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_MGF1_SHA1;
@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ pkcs15_prkey_decrypt(struct sc_pkcs11_session *session, void *obj,
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_OAEP;
/* Omited parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 and SHA1 hash ? */
/* Omitted parameter can use MGF1-SHA1 and SHA1 hash ? */
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL) {
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1;
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_MGF1_SHA1;

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@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ struct sc_pkcs11_slot {
typedef struct sc_pkcs11_slot sc_pkcs11_slot_t;
/* Debug virtual slots. S is slot to be highlighted or NULL
* C is a comment format string and args It will be preceeded by "VSS " */
* C is a comment format string and args It will be preceded by "VSS " */
#define DEBUG_VSS(S, ...) do { sc_log(context,"VSS " __VA_ARGS__); _debug_virtual_slots(S); } while (0)
/* called by DEBUG_VSS to print table of virtual slots */

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@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ card_detect_all(void)
* handle a shrinking slot list
* https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1613632 */
/* Instead, remove the releation between reader and slot */
/* Instead, remove the relation between reader and slot */
for (j = 0; j<list_size(&virtual_slots); j++) {
sc_pkcs11_slot_t *slot = (sc_pkcs11_slot_t *) list_get_at(&virtual_slots, j);
if (slot->reader == reader) {

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@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int asepcos_do_store_pin(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_card_t *card,
if (auth_info->auth_type != SC_PKCS15_PIN_AUTH_TYPE_PIN)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
/* outter tag */
/* outer tag */
*p++ = 0x85;
p++;
/* as a file id for pin with use 0x00:<key id> */

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@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int entersafe_store_key(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
r = SC_ERROR_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED;
}
sc_file_free(tfile);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "cant verify pin");
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "can't verify pin");
data.key_id = (u8) kinfo->key_reference;
data.usage=0x22;
@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static int entersafe_generate_key(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15ca
r = SC_ERROR_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED;
}
sc_file_free(tfile);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "cant verify pin");
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "can't verify pin");
/* generate key pair */
gendat.key_id = (u8) kinfo->key_reference;

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@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ jcop_store_key(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
}
/*
* Generate a keypair
* Generate a key pair
*/
static int
jcop_generate_key(sc_profile_t *profile, sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,

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@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ myeid_generate_key(struct sc_profile *profile, struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
r = sc_card_ctl(card, SC_CARDCTL_MYEID_GENERATE_STORE_KEY, &args);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Card control 'MYEID_GENERATE_STORE_KEY' failed");
/* Keypair generation -> collect public key info */
/* Key pair generation -> collect public key info */
if (pubkey != NULL) {
struct sc_cardctl_myeid_data_obj data_obj;

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@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ setcos_generate_key(struct sc_profile *profile, struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card,
r = sc_card_ctl(p15card->card, SC_CARDCTL_SETCOS_GENERATE_STORE_KEY, &args);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Card control 'GENERATE_STORE_KEY' failed");
/* Keypair generation -> collect public key info */
/* Key pair generation -> collect public key info */
if (pubkey != NULL) {
pubkey->algorithm = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA;
pubkey->u.rsa.modulus.len = (keybits + 7) / 8;

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@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ unsigned long pkcs11_derive(test_cert_t *o, token_info_t * info,
unsigned char *pub = NULL;
size_t pub_len;
/* Conver the public key to the octet string */
/* Convert the public key to the octet string */
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
publickey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key);
pub_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, publickey,

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@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int pss_sign_verify_test(test_cert_t *o, token_info_t *info, test_mech_t *mech)
}
/* ignore the prefilled mechanisms and list all combinations of mechanisms
* found, all resonable hash functions, MGFs and salt lengths
* found, all reasonable hash functions, MGFs and salt lengths
*/
void fill_object_pss_mechanisms(token_info_t *info, test_cert_t *o)
{

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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
TORTURE_OID(small, "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06", 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, -1)
/* Limit what we can fit into the first byte */
TORTURE_OID(limit, "\x7F", 2, 47, -1)
/* The second octet already oveflows to the second byte */
/* The second octet already overflows to the second byte */
TORTURE_OID(two_byte, "\x81\x00", 2, 48, -1)
/* Existing OID ec publickey */
TORTURE_OID(ecpubkey, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x02\x01", 1, 2, 840, 10045, 2, 1, -1)
@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static void torture_asn1_put_tag_long_tag(void **state)
rv = sc_asn1_put_tag(tag, data, data_len, NULL, 0, NULL);
assert_int_equal(rv, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);
/* Fisrt byte has bits 5-1 set to 1 */
/* First byte has bits 5-1 set to 1 */
tag = 0xE0FFFF7F;
rv = sc_asn1_put_tag(tag, data, data_len, NULL, 0, NULL);
assert_int_equal(rv, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA);

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@ -162,18 +162,18 @@ static void show_initial_puk(sc_card_t *card)
u8 buf1[128], buf2[128];
int i;
printf("\nReading crypted Initial-PUK-file: ");
printf("\nReading encrypted Initial-PUK-file: ");
sc_format_path("3F004350",&p);
if((i=sc_select_file(card,&p,&f))<0){
printf("Cannot select crypted Initial-PUK-file, %s\n", sc_strerror(i));
printf("Cannot select encrypted Initial-PUK-file, %s\n", sc_strerror(i));
return;
}
if((i=sc_read_binary(card,0,buf1,128,0))!=128){
printf("Cannot read crypted Initial-PUK-file, %s\n", sc_strerror(i));
printf("Cannot read encrypted Initial-PUK-file, %s\n", sc_strerror(i));
return;
}
printf("OK\nDecrypting crypted Initial-PUK-file: ");
printf("OK\nDecrypting encrypted Initial-PUK-file: ");
sc_format_path("3F00DF01",&p);
if((i=sc_select_file(card,&p,&f))<0){
printf("Cannot select DF01, %s\n", sc_strerror(i));

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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void read_dg(sc_card_t *card, unsigned char sfid, const char *dg_str,
{
int r = iso7816_read_binary_sfid(card, sfid, dg, dg_len);
if (r < 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Coult not read DG %02u %s (%s)\n",
fprintf(stderr, "Could not read DG %02u %s (%s)\n",
sfid, dg_str, sc_strerror(r));
else {
char buf[0x200];
@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static void verify(sc_card_t *card, const char *verify_str,
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
if (r < 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Coult not verify %s (%s)\n",
fprintf(stderr, "Could not verify %s (%s)\n",
verify_str, sc_strerror(r));
else
printf("Verified %s\n", verify_str);

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@ -1197,7 +1197,7 @@ static int do_pininfo(int argc, char **argv)
break;
case SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN:
default:
printf("Login status unkwown.\n");
printf("Login status unknown.\n");
}
if (tries_left >= 0)
printf("%d tries left.\n", tries_left);

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@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ DWORD WINAPI ThreadProc(_In_ LPVOID lpParameter)
return 0;
}
/* This application shall be executable without a console. Therefor we're
/* This application shall be executable without a console. Therefore we're
* creating a windows application that requires `WinMain()` rather than
* `main()` as entry point. As benefit, we can properly handle `WM_CLOSE`. */
int WINAPI

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@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static int list_algorithms(void)
if (card->algorithms[i].flags & alg_flag_names[j].id)
printf(" %s", alg_flag_names[j].str);
/* print RSA spcific flags */
/* print RSA specific flags */
if ( card->algorithms[i].algorithm == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA) {
int padding = card->algorithms[i].flags
& SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PADS;

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@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static const char *option_help[] = {
"Test (best used with the --login or --pin option)",
"Test hotplug capabilities (C_GetSlotList + C_WaitForSlotEvent)",
"Test Mozilla-like keypair gen and cert req, <arg>=certfile",
"Test Mozilla-like key pair gen and cert req, <arg>=certfile",
"Verbose operation. (Set OPENSC_DEBUG to enable OpenSC specific debugging)",
"Set the CKA_PRIVATE attribute (object is only viewable after a login)",
"Set the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute (object cannot be revealed in plaintext)",
@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ static void verify_signature(CK_SLOT_ID slot, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
else if (rv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)
printf("Invalid signature\n");
else
printf("Cryptoki returned erorr: %s\n", CKR2Str(rv));
printf("Cryptoki returned error: %s\n", CKR2Str(rv));
}

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@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ static int wrap_key(sc_context_t *ctx, sc_card_t *card, int keyid, const char *o
ptr += ef_cert_len;
}
// Encode key, key decription and certificate object in sequence
// Encode key, key description and certificate object in sequence
r = wrap_with_tag(0x30, keyblob, ptr - keyblob, &key, &key_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, r, "Out of memory");

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@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
EAC_init();
/* Now we try to change the PIN. Therefor we need to establish a SM channel
/* Now we try to change the PIN. Therefore we need to establish a SM channel
* with PACE.
*
* You could set your PIN with pin=123456; or just leave it at NULL to be