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- first stab at user_consent handling 

git-svn-id: https://www.opensc-project.org/svnp/opensc/trunk@1350 c6295689-39f2-0310-b995-f0e70906c6a9
This commit is contained in:
okir 2003-08-11 14:39:01 +00:00
parent 9f065e840f
commit 11e38e8d29
1 changed files with 19 additions and 0 deletions
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19
src/pkcs11/framework-pkcs15.c
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@ -1669,6 +1669,24 @@ CK_RV pkcs15_prkey_sign(struct sc_pkcs11_session *ses, void *obj,
debug(context, "Initiating signing operation, mechanism 0x%x.\n",
pMechanism->mechanism);
/* If this key requires user consent for every N operations,
* we may have to present the PIN again and again.
* For now, we require that either the terminal has a key pad,
* or the user allows pin caching. We may want to add GUI
* function pointers though.
*/
if (prkey->prv_p15obj->user_consent) {
/* XXX we should really keep track how often the key
* is used, and how often we need to ask the user for
* her PIN.
* For now, we just assume user_consent is 1.
*/
/* XXX - do we require an sc_lock here? */
rv = revalidate_pin(data, ses);
if (rv < 0)
return sc_to_cryptoki_error(rv, ses->slot->card->reader);
}
/* See which of the alternative keys supports signing */
while (prkey
&& !(prkey->prv_info->usage
@ -2112,6 +2130,7 @@ revalidate_pin(struct pkcs15_slot_data *data, struct sc_pkcs11_session *ses)
int rv;
u8 value[MAX_CACHE_PIN];
debug(context, "revalidate_pin called\n");
if (!sc_pkcs11_conf.cache_pins &&
!(ses->slot->token_info.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH))
return SC_ERROR_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED;