opensc/src/libopensc/card-gpk.c

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/*
* card-gpk: Driver for GPK 4000 cards
*
* Copyright (C) 2002 Olaf Kirch <okir@lst.de>
*
* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
#include "internal.h"
#include "cardctl.h"
#include "pkcs15.h"
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/des.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
#define des_cleanse(k) OPENSSL_cleanse(k.ks, sizeof(k.ks))
#else
#define des_cleanse(k) memset(&k, 0, sizeof(k))
#define DES_set_key_unchecked(a,b) des_set_key_unchecked(a,*b)
#define DES_ecb3_encrypt(a,b,c,d,e,f) des_ecb3_encrypt(a,b,*c,*d,*e,f)
#endif
/* Gemplus card variants */
enum {
GPK4000_su256 = 4000,
GPK4000_s,
GPK4000_sp,
GPK4000_sdo,
GPK8000 = 8000,
GPK8000_8K,
GPK8000_16K,
GPK16000 = 16000
};
#define GPK_SEL_MF 0x00
#define GPK_SEL_DF 0x01
#define GPK_SEL_EF 0x02
#define GPK_SEL_AID 0x04
#define GPK_FID_MF 0x3F00
#define GPK_FTYPE_SC 0x21
#define GPK_SIGN_RSA_MD5 0x11
#define GPK_SIGN_RSA_SHA 0x12
#define GPK_SIGN_RSA_SSL 0x18
#define GPK_VERIFY_RSA_MD5 0x21
#define GPK_VERIFY_RSA_SHA 0x22
#define GPK_AUTH_RSA_MD5 0x31
#define GPK_AUTH_RSA_SHA 0x32
#define GPK_AUTH_RSA_SSL 0x38
#define GPK_UNWRAP_RSA 0x77
#define GPK_MAX_PINS 8
#define GPK_HASH_CHUNK 62
/*
* GPK4000 private data
*/
struct gpk_private_data {
int variant;
/* The GPK usually do file offsets in multiples of
* 4 bytes. This can be customized however. We
* should really query for this during gpk_init */
unsigned int offset_shift;
unsigned int offset_mask;
unsigned int locked : 1,
sample_card : 1;
/* access control bits of file most recently selected */
unsigned short int ac[3];
/* is non-zero if we should use secure messaging */
unsigned key_set : 1;
unsigned int key_reference;
u8 key[16];
/* crypto related data from set_security_env */
unsigned int sec_algorithm;
unsigned int sec_hash_len;
unsigned int sec_mod_len;
unsigned int sec_padding;
};
#define DRVDATA(card) ((struct gpk_private_data *) ((card)->drv_data))
static int gpk_get_info(struct sc_card *, u8, u8, u8 *, size_t);
/*
* ATRs of GPK4000 cards courtesy of libscez
*/
static struct atrinfo {
unsigned char atr[SC_MAX_ATR_SIZE];
unsigned int atr_len;
int variant;
const char * name;
} atrlist[] = {
{ "\x3B\x27\x00\x80\x65\xA2\x04\x01\x01\x37", 10, GPK4000_s, "GPK 4K" },
{ "\x3B\x27\x00\x80\x65\xA2\x05\x01\x01\x37", 10, GPK4000_sp, "GPK 4K" },
{ "\x3B\x27\x00\x80\x65\xA2\x0C\x01\x01\x37", 10, GPK4000_su256, "GPK 4K" },
{ "\x3B\xA7\x00\x40\x14\x80\x65\xA2\x14\x01\x01\x37", 12, GPK4000_sdo, "GPK 4K" },
{ "\x3B\xA7\x00\x40\x18\x80\x65\xA2\x08\x01\x01\x52", 12, GPK8000_8K, "GPK 8K" },
{ "\x3B\xA7\x00\x40\x18\x80\x65\xA2\x09\x01\x01\x52", 12, GPK8000_16K, "GPK 8K" },
{ "\x3B\xA7\x00\x40\x18\x80\x65\xA2\x09\x01\x02\x52", 12, GPK16000, "GPK 16K" },
{ "", 0, -1 }
};
/*
* Driver and card ops structures
*/
static struct sc_card_operations gpk_ops, *iso_ops;
static struct sc_card_driver gpk_drv = {
"Gemplus GPK driver",
"gpk",
&gpk_ops
};
/*
* Identify the card variant based on the ATR
* returns the variant number or 0 on error
*/
static int
gpk_identify(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct atrinfo *ai;
/* Gemplus GPK docs say we can use just the
* FMN and PRN fields of the historical bytes
* to recognize a GPK card
* See Table 43, pp. 188
* We'll use the first 2 bytes as well
*/
if ( (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7)
&& (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes[0] == 0x80)
&& (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes[1] == 0x65)
&& (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes[2] == 0xa2)) /* FMN */
{
if (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes[3] == 0x08){ /* PRN? */
return GPK8000;
}
if (card->slot->atr_info.hist_bytes[3] == 0x09){ /* PRN? */
return GPK16000;
}
}
/* if the above ATR-analysis fails, check the known ATR list */
for (ai = atrlist; ai->atr_len; ai++) {
if (card->atr_len >= ai->atr_len
&& !memcmp(card->atr, ai->atr, ai->atr_len))
return ai->variant;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* return 1 iff this driver can handle the card
*/
static int
gpk_match(struct sc_card *card)
{
return gpk_identify(card)? 1 : 0;
}
/*
* Initialize the card struct
*/
static int
gpk_init(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv;
unsigned long exponent, flags, kg;
unsigned char info[13];
int variant;
if (!(variant = gpk_identify(card)))
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_CARD;
card->drv_data = priv = (struct gpk_private_data *) malloc(sizeof(*priv));
if (card->drv_data == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
memset(priv, 0, sizeof(*priv));
priv->variant = variant;
/* read/write/update binary expect offset to be the
* number of 32 bit words.
* offset_shift is the shift value.
* offset_mask is the corresponding mask. */
priv->offset_shift = 2;
priv->offset_mask = 3;
card->cla = 0;
/* Set up algorithm info. GPK 16000 will do any RSA
* exponent, earlier ones are restricted to 0x10001 */
flags = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5 | SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1
| SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5_SHA1;
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1 | SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ANSI
| SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ISO9796;
exponent = (variant < 16000)? 0x10001 : 0;
kg = (variant >= 8000)? SC_ALGORITHM_ONBOARD_KEY_GEN : 0;
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 512, flags|kg, exponent);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 768, flags, exponent);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 1024, flags|kg, exponent);
/* Inspect the LOCK byte */
if (gpk_get_info(card, 0x02, 0xA4, info, sizeof(info)) >= 0) {
if (info[12] & 0x40) {
priv->offset_shift = 0;
priv->offset_mask = 0;
}
if (info[12] & 0x10) {
/* DSA supported - add algo information.
* It's highly unlikely we'll ever see this.
*/
}
if (info[12] & 0x08) {
priv->locked = 1;
}
/* Sample cards use a transport key of "TEST KEYTEST KEY" */
if (!memcmp(info+5, "\x00\xff\x00", 3)) {
priv->sample_card = 1;
}
}
/* State that we have an RNG */
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_RNG;
/* Make sure max send/receive size is 4 byte aligned. */
card->max_send_size &= ~3;
card->max_recv_size &= ~3;
return 0;
}
/*
* Card is being closed; discard any private data etc
*/
static int
gpk_finish(struct sc_card *card)
{
if (card->drv_data)
free(card->drv_data);
card->drv_data = NULL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Error code handling for the GPK4000.
* sc_check_sw doesn't seem to handle all of the
* status words the GPK is capable of returning
*/
#if 0
static int
gpk_check_sw(struct sc_card *card, u8 sw1, u8 sw2)
{
unsigned short int sw = (sw1 << 8) | sw2;
if ((sw & 0xFFF0) == 0x63C0) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "wrong PIN, %u tries left\n", sw&0xf);
return SC_ERROR_PIN_CODE_INCORRECT;
}
switch (sw) {
case 0x6400:
sc_error(card->ctx, "wrong crypto context\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID; /* XXX ??? */
/* The following are handled by iso7816_check_sw
* but all return SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED
* XXX: fix in the iso driver? */
case 0x6983:
sc_error(card->ctx, "PIN is blocked\n");
return SC_ERROR_PIN_CODE_INCORRECT;
case 0x6581:
sc_error(card->ctx, "out of space on card or file\n");
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
case 0x6981:
return SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND;
case 0x6A80:
case 0x6b00:
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
return iso7816_check_sw(card, sw1, sw2);
}
#endif
/*
* Select a DF/EF
*/
static int
match_path(struct sc_card *card, unsigned short int **pathptr, size_t *pathlen,
int need_info)
{
unsigned short int *curptr, *ptr;
size_t curlen, len;
size_t i;
curptr = (unsigned short int *) card->cache.current_path.value;
curlen = card->cache.current_path.len;
ptr = *pathptr;
len = *pathlen;
if (curlen < 1 || len < 1)
return 0;
/* Make sure path starts with MF.
* Note the cached path should always begin with MF. */
if (ptr[0] != GPK_FID_MF || curptr[0] != GPK_FID_MF)
return 0;
for (i = 1; i < len && i < curlen; i++) {
if (ptr[i] != curptr[i])
break;
}
if (len < curlen) {
/* Caller asked us to select the DF, but the
* current file is some EF within the DF we're
* interested in. Say ACK */
if (len == 2)
goto okay;
/* Anything else won't work */
return 0;
}
/* In the case of an exact match:
* If the caller needs info on the file to be selected,
* make sure we at least select the file itself.
* If the DF matches the current DF, just return the
* FID */
if (i == len && need_info) {
if (i > 1) {
*pathptr = ptr + len - 1;
*pathlen = len - 1;
return 1;
}
/* bummer */
return 0;
}
okay:
*pathptr = ptr + i;
*pathlen = len - i;
return 1;
}
static void
ac_to_acl(unsigned short int ac, struct sc_file *file, unsigned int op)
{
unsigned int npins, pin;
npins = (ac >> 14) & 3;
if (npins == 3) {
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NEVER,
SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
return;
}
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
pin = ac & 0xFF;
if (npins >= 1)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, (pin >> 4) & 0xF);
if (npins == 2)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_CHV, pin & 0xF);
/* Check whether secure messaging key is specified */
if (ac & 0x3F00)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, op, SC_AC_PRO, (ac & 0x3F00) >> 8);
}
/*
* Convert ACLs requested by the application to access condition
* bits supported by the GPK. Since these do not map 1:1 there's
* some fuzz involved.
*/
static void
acl_to_ac(struct sc_file *file, unsigned int op, u8 *ac)
{
const struct sc_acl_entry *acl;
unsigned int npins = 0;
ac[0] = ac[1] = 0;
if ((acl = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, op)) == NULL)
return;
assert(acl->method != SC_AC_UNKNOWN);
switch (acl->method) {
case SC_AC_NEVER:
ac[0] = 0xC0;
return;
case SC_AC_NONE:
return;
}
while (acl) {
if (acl->method == SC_AC_CHV) {
/* Support up to 2 PINS only */
if (++npins >= 2)
continue;
ac[1] >>= 4;
ac[1] |= acl->key_ref << 4;
ac[0] += 0x40;
}
if (acl->method == SC_AC_PRO) {
ac[0] |= acl->key_ref & 0x1f;
}
acl = acl->next;
}
}
static int
gpk_parse_fci(struct sc_card *card,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
struct sc_file *file)
{
const u8 *end, *next;
unsigned int tag, len;
end = buf + buflen;
for (; buf + 2 < end; buf = next) {
next = buf + 2 + buf[1];
if (next > end)
break;
tag = *buf++;
len = *buf++;
if (tag == 0x84) {
/* unknown purpose - usually the name, but
* the content looks weird, such as
* 84 0D A0 00 00 00 18 0F 00 00 01 63 00 01 04
*/
} else
if (tag == 0xC1 && len >= 2) {
/* Seems to be the file id, followed by something
* C1 04 02 00 00 00 */
file->id = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
} else
if (tag == 0xC2) {
/* unknown purpose
* C2 01 01
*/
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
gpk_parse_fileinfo(struct sc_card *card,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
struct sc_file *file)
{
const u8 *sp, *end, *next;
int i, rc;
memset(file, 0, sizeof(*file));
for (i = 0; i < SC_MAX_AC_OPS; i++)
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, i, SC_AC_UNKNOWN, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
end = buf + buflen;
for (sp = buf; sp + 2 < end; sp = next) {
next = sp + 2 + sp[1];
if (next > end)
break;
if (sp[0] == 0x84) {
/* ignore if name is longer than what it should be */
if (sp[1] > sizeof(file->name))
continue;
memset(file->name, 0, sizeof(file->name));
memcpy(file->name, sp+2, sp[1]);
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x85) {
unsigned int ac[3], n;
file->id = (sp[4] << 8) | sp[5];
file->size = (sp[8] << 8) | sp[9];
file->record_length = sp[7];
/* Map ACLs. Note the third AC byte is
* valid of EFs only */
for (n = 0; n < 3; n++)
ac[n] = (sp[10+2*n] << 8) | sp[11+2*n];
/* Examine file type */
switch (sp[6] & 7) {
case 0x01: case 0x02: case 0x03: case 0x04:
case 0x05: case 0x06: case 0x07:
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF;
file->ef_structure = sp[6] & 7;
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE);
ac_to_acl(ac[2], file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
break;
case 0x00: /* 0x38 is DF */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
/* Icky: the GPK uses different ACLs
* for creating data files and
* 'sensitive' i.e. key files */
ac_to_acl(ac[0], file, SC_AC_OP_LOCK);
ac_to_acl(ac[1], file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_SELECT,
SC_AC_NONE, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_REHABILITATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_INVALIDATE,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
sc_file_add_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_LIST_FILES,
SC_AC_NEVER, SC_AC_KEY_REF_NONE);
break;
}
} else
if (sp[0] == 0x6f) {
/* oops - this is a directory with an IADF.
* This happens with the personalized GemSafe cards
* for instance. */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
rc = gpk_parse_fci(card, sp + 2, sp[1], file);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
}
if (file->record_length)
file->record_count = file->size / file->record_length;
file->magic = SC_FILE_MAGIC;
return 0;
}
static int
gpk_select(struct sc_card *card, u8 kind,
const u8 *buf, size_t buflen,
struct sc_file **file)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 resbuf[256];
int r;
/* If we're about to select a DF, invalidate secure messaging keys */
if (kind == GPK_SEL_MF || kind == GPK_SEL_DF) {
memset(priv->key, 0, sizeof(priv->key));
priv->key_set = 0;
}
/* do the apdu thing */
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cla = 0x00;
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.ins = 0xA4;
apdu.p1 = kind;
apdu.p2 = 0;
apdu.data = buf;
apdu.datalen = buflen;
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen;
if (file) {
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
apdu.resp = resbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(resbuf);
apdu.le = sizeof(resbuf);
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
/* Nothing we can say about it... invalidate
* path cache */
if (kind == GPK_SEL_AID) {
card->cache.current_path.len = 0;
}
if (file == NULL)
return 0;
*file = sc_file_new();
r = gpk_parse_fileinfo(card, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen, *file);
if (r < 0) {
sc_file_free(*file);
*file = NULL;
}
return r;
}
static int
gpk_select_id(struct sc_card *card, u8 kind, unsigned short int fid,
struct sc_file **file)
{
struct sc_path *cp = &card->cache.current_path;
u8 fbuf[2];
int r;
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_select_id(0x%04X, kind=%u)\n", fid, kind);
fbuf[0] = fid >> 8;
fbuf[1] = fid & 0xff;
card->ctx->suppress_errors++;
r = gpk_select(card, kind, fbuf, 2, file);
card->ctx->suppress_errors--;
/* Fix up the path cache.
* NB we never cache the ID of an EF, just the DF path */
if (r == 0) {
unsigned short int *path;
switch (kind) {
case GPK_SEL_MF:
cp->len = 0;
/* fallthru */
case GPK_SEL_DF:
assert(cp->len + 1 <= SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE / 2);
path = (unsigned short int *) cp->value;
path[cp->len++] = fid;
}
} else {
cp->len = 0;
}
return r;
}
static int
gpk_select_file(struct sc_card *card, const struct sc_path *path,
struct sc_file **file)
{
unsigned short int pathtmp[SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE/2];
unsigned short int *pathptr;
size_t pathlen, n;
int locked = 0, r = 0, use_relative = 0, retry = 1;
u8 leaf_type;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, 1);
/* Handle the AID case first */
if (path->type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME) {
if (path->len > 16)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
r = gpk_select(card, GPK_SEL_AID,
path->value, path->len, file);
goto done;
}
/* Now we know we're dealing with 16bit FIDs, either as
* an absolute path name (SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH) or a relative
* FID (SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID)
*
* The API should really tell us whether this is a DF or EF
* we're selecting. All we can do is read tea leaves...
*/
leaf_type = GPK_SEL_EF;
try_again:
if ((path->len & 1) || path->len > sizeof(pathtmp))
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
pathptr = pathtmp;
for (n = 0; n < path->len; n += 2)
pathptr[n>>1] = (path->value[n] << 8)|path->value[n+1];
pathlen = path->len >> 1;
/* See whether we can skip an initial portion of the
* (absolute) path */
if (path->type == SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH) {
/* Do not retry selecting if this cannot be a DF */
if ((pathptr[0] == GPK_FID_MF && pathlen > 2)
|| (pathptr[0] != GPK_FID_MF && pathlen > 1))
retry = 0;
use_relative = match_path(card, &pathptr, &pathlen, file != 0);
if (pathlen == 0)
goto done;
} else {
/* SC_PATH_TYPE_FILEID */
if (pathlen > 1)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
use_relative = 1;
}
if (pathlen == 1 && pathptr[0] == GPK_FID_MF) {
/* Select just the MF */
leaf_type = GPK_SEL_MF;
} else {
if (!locked++) {
r = sc_lock(card);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "sc_lock() failed");
}
/* Do we need to select the MF first? */
if (!use_relative) {
r = gpk_select_id(card, GPK_SEL_MF, GPK_FID_MF, NULL);
if (r)
sc_unlock(card);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Unable to select MF");
/* Consume the MF FID if it's there */
if (pathptr[0] == GPK_FID_MF) {
pathptr++;
pathlen--;
}
if (pathlen == 0)
goto done;
}
/* Next comes a DF, if at all.
* This loop can deal with nesting levels > 1 even
* though the GPK4000 doesn't support it. */
while (pathlen > 1) {
r = gpk_select_id(card, GPK_SEL_DF, pathptr[0], NULL);
if (r)
sc_unlock(card);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Unable to select DF");
pathptr++;
pathlen--;
}
}
/* Remaining component will be a DF or EF. How do we find out?
* All we can do is try */
r = gpk_select_id(card, leaf_type, pathptr[0], file);
if (r) {
/* Did we guess EF, and were wrong? If so, invalidate
* path cache and try again; this time aiming for a DF */
if (leaf_type == GPK_SEL_EF && retry) {
card->cache.current_path.len = 0;
leaf_type = GPK_SEL_DF;
goto try_again;
}
}
done:
if (locked)
sc_unlock(card);
return r;
}
/*
* GPK versions of {read,write,update}_binary functions.
* Required because by default the GPKs do word offsets
*/
static int
gpk_read_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int offset,
u8 *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (offset & priv->offset_mask) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Invalid file offset (not a multiple of %d)",
priv->offset_mask + 1);
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
return iso_ops->read_binary(card, offset >> priv->offset_shift,
buf, count, flags);
}
static int
gpk_write_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int offset,
const u8 *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (offset & priv->offset_mask) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Invalid file offset (not a multiple of %d)",
priv->offset_mask + 1);
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
return iso_ops->write_binary(card, offset >> priv->offset_shift,
buf, count, flags);
}
static int
gpk_update_binary(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int offset,
const u8 *buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
if (offset & priv->offset_mask) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Invalid file offset (not a multiple of %d)",
priv->offset_mask + 1);
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
return iso_ops->update_binary(card, offset >> priv->offset_shift,
buf, count, flags);
}
/*
* Secure messaging
*/
static int
gpk_compute_crycks(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *apdu,
u8 *crycks1)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
des_key_schedule k1, k2;
u8 in[8], out[8], block[64];
unsigned int len = 0, i, j;
/* Set the key schedule */
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) priv->key, &k1);
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) (priv->key+8), &k2);
/* Fill block with 0x00 and then with the data. */
memset(block, 0x00, sizeof(block));
block[len++] = apdu->cla;
block[len++] = apdu->ins;
block[len++] = apdu->p1;
block[len++] = apdu->p2;
block[len++] = apdu->lc + 3;
if ((i = apdu->datalen) + len > sizeof(block))
i = sizeof(block) - len;
memcpy(block+len, apdu->data, i);
len += i;
/* Set IV */
memset(in, 0x00, 8);
for (j = 0; j < len; ) {
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, j++)
in[i] ^= block[j];
DES_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *)in,
(des_cblock *)out,
&k1, &k2, &k1, DES_ENCRYPT);
memcpy(in, out, 8);
}
memcpy((u8 *) (apdu->data + apdu->datalen), out + 5, 3);
apdu->datalen += 3;
apdu->lc += 3;
apdu->le += 3;
if (crycks1)
memcpy(crycks1, out, 3);
des_cleanse(k1);
des_cleanse(k2);
memset(in, 0, sizeof(in));
memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify secure messaging response
*/
static int
gpk_verify_crycks(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *apdu, u8 *crycks)
{
if (apdu->resplen < 3
|| memcmp(apdu->resp + apdu->resplen - 3, crycks, 3)) {
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "Invalid secure messaging reply\n");
return SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED;
}
apdu->resplen -= 3;
return 0;
}
/*
* Create a file or directory.
* This is a bit tricky because we abuse the ef_structure
* field to transport file types that are non-standard
* (the GPK4000 has lots of bizarre file types).
*/
static int
gpk_create_file(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 data[28+3], crycks[3], resp[3];
size_t datalen, namelen;
int r;
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_create_file(0x%04X)\n", file->id);
/* Prepare APDU */
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cla = 0x80; /* assume no secure messaging */
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.ins = 0xE0;
apdu.p2 = 0x00;
/* clear data */
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
datalen = 12;
/* FID */
data[0] = file->id >> 8;
data[1] = file->id & 0xFF;
/* encode ACLs */
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
/* The GPK4000 has separate AC bits for
* creating sensitive files and creating
* data files. Since OpenSC has just the notion
* of "file" we use the same ACL for both AC words
*/
apdu.p1 = 0x01; /* create DF */
data[2] = 0x38;
acl_to_ac(file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, data + 6);
acl_to_ac(file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE, data + 8);
if ((namelen = file->namelen) != 0) {
if (namelen > 16)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
memcpy(data+datalen, file->name, namelen);
data[5] = namelen;
datalen += namelen;
}
} else {
apdu.p1 = 0x02; /* create EF */
data[2] = file->ef_structure;
data[3] = file->record_length;
data[4] = file->size >> 8;
data[5] = file->size & 0xff;
acl_to_ac(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE, data + 6);
acl_to_ac(file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE, data + 8);
acl_to_ac(file, SC_AC_OP_READ, data + 10);
}
apdu.data = data;
apdu.datalen = datalen;
apdu.lc = datalen;
if (priv->key_set) {
apdu.cla = 0x84;
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
r = gpk_compute_crycks(card, &apdu, crycks);
if (r)
return r;
apdu.resp = resp;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(resp); /* XXX? */
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
/* verify secure messaging response */
if (priv->key_set)
r = gpk_verify_crycks(card, &apdu, crycks);
return r;
}
/*
* Set the secure messaging key following a Select FileKey
*/
static int
gpk_set_filekey(const u8 *key, const u8 *challenge,
const u8 *r_rn, u8 *kats)
{
des_key_schedule k1, k2;
des_cblock out;
int r = 0;
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) key, &k1);
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) (key+8), &k2);
DES_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *)(r_rn+4), (des_cblock *) kats,
&k1, &k2, &k1, DES_ENCRYPT);
DES_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *)(r_rn+4), (des_cblock *) (kats+8),
&k2, &k1, &k2, DES_ENCRYPT);
/* Verify Cryptogram presented by the card terminal
* XXX: what is the appropriate error code to return
* here? INVALID_ARGS doesn't seem quite right
*/
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) kats, &k1);
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) (kats+8), &k2);
DES_ecb3_encrypt((des_cblock *) challenge, &out,
&k1, &k2, &k1, DES_ENCRYPT );
if (memcmp(r_rn, out+4, 4) != 0)
r = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
des_cleanse(k1);
des_cleanse(k2);
memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
return r;
}
/*
* Verify a key presented by the user for secure messaging
*/
static int
gpk_select_key(struct sc_card *card, int key_sfi, const u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 random[8], resp[258];
int r;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, 1);
if (buflen != 16)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* now do the SelFk */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(random, sizeof(random));
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
apdu.ins = 0x28;
apdu.p1 = 0;
apdu.p2 = key_sfi;
apdu.data = random;
apdu.datalen = sizeof(random);
apdu.lc = apdu.datalen;
apdu.resp = resp;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(resp);
apdu.le = 12;
apdu.sensitive = 1;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
if (apdu.resplen != 12) {
r = SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED;
} else
if ((r = gpk_set_filekey(buf, random, resp, priv->key)) == 0) {
priv->key_set = 1;
priv->key_reference = key_sfi;
}
memset(resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
return r;
}
/*
* Select a security environment (Set Crypto Context in GPK docs).
* When we get here, the PK file has already been selected.
*
* Issue: the GPK distinguishes between "signing" and
* "card internal authentication". I don't know whether this
* makes any difference in practice...
*
* Issue: it seems that sc_compute_signature() does not hash
* the data for the caller. So what is the purpose of HASH_SHA
* and other flags?
*/
static int
gpk_set_security_env(struct sc_card *card,
const struct sc_security_env *env,
int se_num)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned int context, algorithm;
unsigned int file_id;
u8 sysrec[7];
int r;
/* According to several sources from GemPlus, they don't
* have off the shelf cards that do DSA. So I won't bother
* with implementing this stuff here. */
algorithm = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA;
if (env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_ALG_PRESENT)
algorithm = env->algorithm;
if (algorithm != SC_ALGORITHM_RSA) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Algorithm not supported.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
priv->sec_algorithm = algorithm;
/* If there's a key reference, it must be 0 */
if ((env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_KEY_REF_PRESENT)
&& (env->key_ref_len != 1 || env->key_ref[0] != 0)) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Unknown key referenced.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* Right now, the OpenSC flags do not support any padding
* other than PKCS#1. */
if (env->flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1)
priv->sec_padding = 0;
else if (env->flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ANSI)
priv->sec_padding = 1;
else if (env->flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ISO9796)
priv->sec_padding = 2;
else {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Padding algorithm not supported.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
switch (env->operation) {
case SC_SEC_OPERATION_SIGN:
/* Again, the following may not make any difference
* because we don't do any hashing on-card. But
* what the hell, we have all those nice macros,
* so why not use them :)
*/
if (env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1) {
context = GPK_SIGN_RSA_SHA;
priv->sec_hash_len = 20;
} else
if (env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5_SHA1) {
context = GPK_SIGN_RSA_SSL;
priv->sec_hash_len = 36;
} else
if (env->algorithm_flags & SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5) {
context = GPK_SIGN_RSA_MD5;
priv->sec_hash_len = 16;
} else {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Unsupported signature algorithm");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
break;
case SC_SEC_OPERATION_DECIPHER:
context = GPK_UNWRAP_RSA;
break;
default:
sc_error(card->ctx, "Crypto operation not supported.\n");
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* Get the file ID */
if (env->flags & SC_SEC_ENV_FILE_REF_PRESENT) {
if (env->file_ref.len != 2) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "File reference: invalid length.\n");
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
file_id = (env->file_ref.value[0] << 8)
| env->file_ref.value[1];
} else {
sc_error(card->ctx, "File reference missing.\n");
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
/* Select the PK file. The caller has already selected
* the DF. */
r = gpk_select_id(card, GPK_SEL_EF, file_id, NULL);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to select PK file");
/* Read the sys record of the PK file to find out the key length */
r = sc_read_record(card, 1, sysrec, sizeof(sysrec),
SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to read PK sysrec");
if (r != 7 || sysrec[0] != 0) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "First record of file is not the sysrec");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
if (sysrec[5] != 0x00) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "Public key is not an RSA key");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
switch (sysrec[1]) {
case 0x00: priv->sec_mod_len = 512 / 8; break;
case 0x10: priv->sec_mod_len = 768 / 8; break;
case 0x11: priv->sec_mod_len = 1024 / 8; break;
default:
sc_error(card->ctx, "Unsupported modulus length");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
/* Now do SelectCryptoContext */
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0xA6;
apdu.p1 = file_id & 0x1f;
apdu.p2 = context;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
return r;
}
/*
* Restore security environment
* Not sure what this is supposed to do.
*/
static int
gpk_restore_security_env(struct sc_card *card, int se_num)
{
return 0;
}
/*
* Revert buffer (needed for all GPK crypto operations because
* they want LSB byte order internally
*/
static int
reverse(u8 *out, size_t outlen, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
{
if (inlen > outlen)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
outlen = inlen;
while (inlen--)
*out++ = in[inlen];
return outlen;
}
/*
* Use the card's on-board hashing functions to hash some data
*/
#ifdef dontuse
static int
gpk_hash(struct sc_card *card, const u8 *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned int count, chain, len;
int r;
chain = 0x01;
for (count = 0; count < datalen; count += len) {
unsigned char buffer[GPK_HASH_CHUNK+2];
if ((len = datalen - count) > GPK_HASH_CHUNK)
len = GPK_HASH_CHUNK;
else
chain |= 0x10;
buffer[0] = 0x55;
buffer[1] = len;
memcpy(buffer+2, data + count, len);
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0xDA;
apdu.p1 = chain;
apdu.p2 = len;
apdu.lc = len + 2;
apdu.data= buffer;
apdu.datalen = len + 2;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
chain = 0;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
/*
* Send the hashed data to the card.
*/
static int
gpk_init_hashed(struct sc_card *card, const u8 *digest, unsigned int len)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 tsegid[64];
int r;
r = reverse(tsegid, sizeof(tsegid), digest, len);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to reverse buffer");
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0xEA;
apdu.lc = len;
apdu.data= tsegid;
apdu.datalen = len;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
return r;
}
/*
* Compute a signature.
* Note we hash everything manually and send it to the card.
*/
static int
gpk_compute_signature(struct sc_card *card, const u8 *data,
size_t data_len, u8 * out, size_t outlen)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 cardsig[1024/8];
int r;
if (data_len > priv->sec_mod_len) {
sc_error(card->ctx,
"Data length (%u) does not match key modulus %u.\n",
data_len, priv->sec_mod_len);
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
if (sizeof(cardsig) < priv->sec_mod_len)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
r = gpk_init_hashed(card, data, data_len);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to send hash to card");
/* Now sign the hash.
* The GPK has Internal Authenticate and PK_Sign. I am not
* sure what the difference between the two is. */
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0x86;
#if 0
/* Don't know why I did this. It conflicts with the spec
* (but it worked with the gpk4k, strange). --okir */
apdu.p1 = priv->sec_padding;
apdu.p2 = priv->sec_mod_len;
#else
apdu.p2 = priv->sec_padding;
#endif
apdu.resp= cardsig;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(cardsig);
apdu.le = priv->sec_mod_len;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
/* The GPK returns the signature as little endian numbers.
* Need to revert these */
r = reverse(out, outlen, cardsig, apdu.resplen);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to reverse signature");
return r;
}
/*
* Decrypt some RSA encrypted piece of data.
* Due to legal restrictions, the GPK will not let you see the
* full cleartext block, just the last N bytes.
* The GPK documentation refers to N as the MaxSessionKey size,
* probably because this feature limits the maximum size of an
* SSL session key you will be able to decrypt using this card.
*/
static int
gpk_decipher(struct sc_card *card, const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
u8 *out, size_t outlen)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 buffer[256];
int r;
if (inlen != priv->sec_mod_len) {
sc_error(card->ctx,
"Data length (%u) does not match key modulus %u.\n",
inlen, priv->sec_mod_len);
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
/* First revert the cryptogram */
r = reverse(buffer, sizeof(buffer), in, inlen);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cryptogram too large");
in = buffer;
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0x1C;
apdu.p2 = 0; /* PKCS1 padding */
apdu.lc = inlen;
apdu.data= in;
apdu.datalen = inlen;
apdu.resp= buffer;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(buffer);
apdu.sensitive = 1;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
/* Reverse the data we got back */
r = reverse(out, outlen, buffer, apdu.resplen);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to reverse buffer");
return r;
}
/*
* Erase card
*/
static int
gpk_erase_card(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 offset;
int r;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, 1);
switch (priv->variant) {
case GPK4000_su256:
case GPK4000_sdo:
offset = 0x6B; /* courtesy gemplus hotline */
break;
case GPK4000_s:
offset = 7;
break;
case GPK8000:
case GPK8000_8K:
case GPK8000_16K:
case GPK16000:
offset = 0;
break;
default:
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
apdu.cla = 0xDB;
apdu.ins = 0xDE;
apdu.p2 = offset;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
priv->key_set = 0;
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, 2, r);
}
/*
* Lock a file Access Condition.
*
* File must be selected, and we assume that any authentication
* that needs to be presented in order to allow this operation
* have been presented (ACs from the DF; AC1 for sensitive files,
* AC2 for normal files).
*/
static int
gpk_lock(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_gpk_lock *args)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_file *file = args->file;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
u8 data[8], crycks[3], resp[3];
int r;
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_lock(0x%04X, %u)\n",
file->id, args->operation);
memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
data[0] = file->id >> 8;
data[1] = file->id;
switch (args->operation) {
case SC_AC_OP_UPDATE:
data[2] = 0x40; break;
case SC_AC_OP_WRITE:
data[3] = 0x40; break;
case SC_AC_OP_READ:
data[4] = 0x40; break;
default:
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
}
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0x16;
apdu.p1 = (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF)? 1 : 2;
apdu.p2 = 0;
apdu.lc = 5;
apdu.datalen = 5;
apdu.data = data;
if (priv->key_set) {
apdu.cla = 0x84;
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
r = gpk_compute_crycks(card, &apdu, crycks);
if (r)
return r;
apdu.resp = resp;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(resp); /* XXX? */
}
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
if (priv->key_set)
r = gpk_verify_crycks(card, &apdu, crycks);
return r;
}
/*
* Initialize the private portion of a public key file
*/
static int
gpk_pkfile_init(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_gpk_pkinit *args)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
int r;
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_pkfile_init(%u)\n", args->privlen);
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0x12;
apdu.p1 = args->file->id & 0x1F;
apdu.p2 = args->privlen / 4;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
return r;
}
/*
* Initialize the private portion of a public key file
*/
static int
gpk_generate_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_gpk_genkey *args)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
int r;
u8 buffer[256];
if (card->ctx->debug)
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_generate_key(%u)\n", args->privlen);
if (args->privlen != 512 && args->privlen != 1024) {
sc_error(card->ctx,
"Key generation not supported for key length %d",
args->privlen);
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0xD2;
apdu.p1 = 0x80 | (args->fid & 0x1F);
apdu.p2 = (args->privlen == 1024) ? 0x11 : 0;
apdu.le = args->privlen / 8 + 2;
apdu.resp = buffer;
apdu.resplen = 256;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
/* Return the public key, inverted.
* The first two bytes must be stripped off. */
if (args->pubkey_len && apdu.resplen > 2) {
r = reverse(args->pubkey, args->pubkey_len,
buffer + 2, apdu.resplen - 2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Failed to reverse buffer");
args->pubkey_len = r;
}
return r;
}
/*
* Store a privat key component
*/
static int
gpk_pkfile_load(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_gpk_pkload *args)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
des_key_schedule k1, k2;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned int n;
u8 temp[256];
int r;
sc_debug(card->ctx, "gpk_pkfile_load(fid=%04x, len=%d, datalen=%d)\n",
args->file->id, args->len, args->datalen);
#if 0
if (card->ctx->debug > 5) {
char buf[2048];
sc_hex_dump(card->ctx, args->data, args->datalen,
buf, sizeof(buf));
sc_debug(card->ctx, "Sending %d bytes (cleartext):\n%s",
args->datalen, buf);
}
#endif
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0x18;
apdu.p1 = args->file->id & 0x1F;
apdu.p2 = args->len;
apdu.lc = args->datalen;
apdu.sensitive = 1;
/* encrypt the private key material */
assert(args->datalen <= sizeof(temp));
if (!priv->key_set) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "No secure messaging key set!\n");
return SC_ERROR_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED;
}
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) priv->key, &k1);
DES_set_key_unchecked((des_cblock *) (priv->key+8), &k2);
for (n = 0; n < args->datalen; n += 8) {
des_ecb2_encrypt((des_cblock *) (args->data + n),
(des_cblock *) (temp + n),
k1, k2, DES_ENCRYPT);
}
apdu.data = temp;
apdu.datalen = args->datalen;
/* Forget the key. The card seems to forget it, too :) */
priv->key_set = 0;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, 1, r);
}
/*
* This function lets pkcs15init query for the transport key
*/
static int
gpk_get_default_key(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_cardctl_default_key *data)
{
if (data->method == SC_AC_PRO && data->key_ref == 1) {
if (data->len < 16)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
memcpy(data->key_data, "TEST KEYTEST KEY", 16);
data->len = 16;
return 0;
}
return SC_ERROR_NO_DEFAULT_KEY;
}
/*
* Get the maximum size of a session key the card is
* willing to decrypt
*/
#if 0
static int
gpk_max_session_key(struct sc_card *card)
{
struct gpk_private_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
struct sc_path path;
u8 value;
int r;
if (priv->max_session_key)
return priv->max_session_key;
/* GPK cards limit the amount of data they're willing
* to RSA decrypt. This data is stored in EFMaxSessionKey */
sc_format_path("01000001", &path);
if ((r = sc_select_file(card, &path, NULL)) < 0
|| (r = sc_read_binary(card, 0, &value, 1, 0)) < 0)
return r;
priv->max_session_key = value;
return value;
}
#endif
/*
* GetInfo call
*/
int
gpk_get_info(struct sc_card *card, u8 p1, u8 p2, u8 *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
int r, retry = 0;
/* We may have to retry the get info command. It
* returns 6B00 if a previous command returned a 61xx response,
* but the host failed to collect the results.
*
* Note the additional sc_lock/sc_unlock pair, which
* is required to prevent sc_transmit_apdu from
* calling logout(), which in turn does a SELECT MF
* without collecting the response :)
*/
r = sc_lock(card);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "sc_lock() failed");
do {
memset(&apdu, 0, sizeof(apdu));
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.ins = 0xC0;
apdu.p1 = p1;
apdu.p2 = p2;
apdu.le = buflen;
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = buflen;
if ((r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu)) < 0) {
sc_error(card->ctx, "APDU transmit failed: %s",
sc_strerror(r));
sc_unlock(card);
return r;
}
} while (apdu.sw1 == 0x6B && apdu.sw2 == 0x00 && retry++ < 1);
sc_unlock(card);
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Card returned error");
return r;
}
/*
* Dispatch card_ctl calls
*/
static int
gpk_card_ctl(struct sc_card *card, unsigned long cmd, void *ptr)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SC_CARDCTL_ERASE_CARD:
return gpk_erase_card(card);
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_DEFAULT_KEY:
return gpk_get_default_key(card,
(struct sc_cardctl_default_key *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_VARIANT:
*(int *) ptr = DRVDATA(card)->variant;
return 0;
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_LOCK:
return gpk_lock(card, (struct sc_cardctl_gpk_lock *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_PKINIT:
return gpk_pkfile_init(card,
(struct sc_cardctl_gpk_pkinit *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_PKLOAD:
return gpk_pkfile_load(card,
(struct sc_cardctl_gpk_pkload *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_IS_LOCKED:
*(int *) ptr = DRVDATA(card)->locked;
return 0;
case SC_CARDCTL_GPK_GENERATE_KEY:
return gpk_generate_key(card,
(struct sc_cardctl_gpk_genkey *) ptr);
}
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
static int
gpk_build_pin_apdu(sc_card_t *card, sc_apdu_t *apdu, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data)
{
static u8 sbuf[8];
int r;
if (data->pin_type != SC_AC_CHV)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* XXX deal with secure messaging here */
memset(apdu, 0, sizeof(*apdu));
apdu->cse = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
data->flags |= SC_PIN_CMD_NEED_PADDING;
switch (data->cmd) {
case SC_PIN_CMD_VERIFY:
/* Copy PIN to buffer and pad */
data->pin1.encoding = SC_PIN_ENCODING_ASCII;
data->pin1.pad_length = 8;
data->pin1.pad_char = 0x00;
data->pin1.offset = 5;
r = sc_build_pin(sbuf, 8, &data->pin1, 1);
if (r < 0)
return r;
apdu->cla = 0x00;
apdu->ins = 0x20;
apdu->p1 = 0x00;
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE:
case SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK:
/* Copy PINs to buffer, BCD-encoded, and pad */
data->pin1.encoding = SC_PIN_ENCODING_BCD;
data->pin1.pad_length = 8;
data->pin1.pad_char = 0x00;
data->pin1.offset = 5;
data->pin2.encoding = SC_PIN_ENCODING_BCD;
data->pin2.pad_length = 8;
data->pin2.pad_char = 0x00;
data->pin2.offset = 5 + 4;
if ((r = sc_build_pin(sbuf, 4, &data->pin1, 1)) < 0
|| (r = sc_build_pin(sbuf + 4, 4, &data->pin2, 1)) < 0)
return r;
apdu->cla = 0x80;
apdu->ins = 0x24;
apdu->p1 = (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE)? 0x00 : 0x01;
break;
default:
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
apdu->p2 = data->pin_reference & 7;
apdu->lc = 8;
apdu->datalen = 8;
apdu->data = sbuf;
apdu->sensitive = 1;
return 0;
}
static int
gpk_pin_cmd(sc_card_t *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
int r;
/* Special case - External Authenticate */
if (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_VERIFY
&& data->pin_type == SC_AC_PRO)
return gpk_select_key(card,
data->pin_reference,
data->pin1.data,
data->pin1.len);
r = gpk_build_pin_apdu(card, &apdu, data);
if (r < 0)
return r;
data->apdu = &apdu;
return iso_ops->pin_cmd(card, data, tries_left);
}
/*
* Initialize the driver struct
*/
static struct sc_card_driver *
sc_get_driver()
{
if (gpk_ops.match_card == NULL) {
struct sc_card_driver *iso_drv;
iso_drv = sc_get_iso7816_driver();
iso_ops = iso_drv->ops;
gpk_ops = *iso_ops;
gpk_ops.match_card = gpk_match;
gpk_ops.init = gpk_init;
gpk_ops.finish = gpk_finish;
gpk_ops.select_file = gpk_select_file;
gpk_ops.read_binary = gpk_read_binary;
gpk_ops.write_binary = gpk_write_binary;
gpk_ops.update_binary = gpk_update_binary;
gpk_ops.create_file = gpk_create_file;
/* gpk_ops.check_sw = gpk_check_sw; */
gpk_ops.card_ctl = gpk_card_ctl;
gpk_ops.set_security_env= gpk_set_security_env;
gpk_ops.restore_security_env= gpk_restore_security_env;
gpk_ops.compute_signature= gpk_compute_signature;
gpk_ops.decipher = gpk_decipher;
gpk_ops.pin_cmd = gpk_pin_cmd;
}
return &gpk_drv;
}
struct sc_card_driver *
sc_get_gpk_driver()
{
return sc_get_driver();
}
#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */